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COMMENTS
CRIMINAL LAW-PAROLEES EXTENDED SIGNIFICANT PROTECTION
FROM WARRANTLESS SEARCHES OF RESIDENCES BY PAROLE OFFICERS.
United States v. Bradley, 571 F.2d 787 (4th Cir. 1978).
Parole officers have long enjoyed broad powers to search pa-
rolees under their supervision.' In United States v. Bradley,2 the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals extended to parolees significant
protection from warrantless searches of personal residences by
parole officers. This protection previously had not been provided
by any federal court or by the highest court of any state.'
Bradley held that "unless an established exception to the
warrant requirement is applicable, a parole officer must secure a
warrant prior to conducting a search of a parolee's place of resi-
dence . . . . The warrant requirement is not obviated even
when, as a condition of parole, the parolee has consented to peri-
odic and unannounced visits by the parole officer.5 Noncompli-
ance with this procedural safeguard results in the exclusion of
evidence obtained in the search from any new criminal prosecu-
tion By excluding illegally obtained evidence from new prosecu-
tions, the court in Bradley extended to parolees the same fourth
and fourteenth amendment protections afforded other citizens,
with one possible variation. The court did not decide whether the
standard of probable cause that must be shown-to secure a war-
rant to search a parolee's home is as rigorous as must be shown
for a warrant to search a suspect's home in an ordinary criminal
investigation.
7
Appellant George Bradley was paroled in 1976 after serving
four years of a sentence received as a result of a state conviction.
1. See, e.g., People v. Hernandez, 229 Cal. App. 2d 143, 40 Cal. Rptr. 100 (1964), cert.
denied, 381 U.S. 953 (1965).
2. 571 F.2d 787 (4th Cir. 1978).
3. See Annot., 32 A.L.R. FED. 155 (1977).
4. 571 F.2d at 789.
5. Id. For a discussion of consent to visitations and searches as a condition of parole,
see Note, Parole: A Critique of Its Legal Foundations and Conditions, 38 N.Y.U.L. REv.
702, 729-33 (1963); Comment, The Parole System, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 282, 330-39 (1971).
6. 571 F.2d at 790 n.6. The court was not presented with and therefore did not address
the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence at a parole revocation hearing. Id. In United
States v. Workman, 585 F.2d 1205 (4th Cir. 1978), the court did discuss the exclusion of
illegally obtained evidence at a probation revocation hearing. See text accompanying
notes 67-68 infra.
7. See text accompanying notes 16-25 infra.
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Pertinent conditions of his parole agreement included that he
obey all municipal, state, and federal laws, that he refrain from
possession of a firearm without permission, and that he permit his
parole officer to visit his home or place of employment. Consent
to searches during these visits was not a parole condition. Early
one morning Bradley's parole officer, Karen Murphy, received
information from a reliable informant that Bradley was in posses-
sion of a loaded firearm.' Six hours later, at approximately nine
in the morning, Murphy and another parole officer conducted a
search of Bradley's residence. No warrant had been sought. Dur-
ing the search, Murphy found a firearm in a suitcase that was
located behind a door
In addition to having his parole revoked, Bradley was con-
victed of violating federal firearms laws."0 His only assignment of
error on appeal was that the district court denied his motion to
suppress introduction of the firearm at that trial as the fruit of
an unlawful search and seizure. The court of appeals reversed and
remanded.
Except in California, the search and seizure rights of parolees
infrequently have been litigated. Courts that have considered the
issue generally agree that a parolee's fourth amendment rights
are more limited than those of an ordinary citizen," and that
although a warrantless search of a parolee's home must be reason-
able under the fourth amendment, the standards of reasonable-
ness which apply are not as rigorous as those applied to an ordi-
nary person.'2 Two considerations that underlie decisions of the
courts are the extent of police, as opposed to parole officer, partic-
8. 571 F.2d at 788. "It is not disputed by Bradley that parole officer Murphy had
probable cause to obtain a warrant. Murphy's informants were known to her and were
themselves in a position to have personal knowledge of the information supplied to her.
Additionally, they were specific in the information given. . . ." Id. at n.1. See generally
Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964);
Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
9. The firearm was also wrapped in a shirt within the suitcase. It is clear, therefore,
that the plain view exception to the warrant requirement did not apply.
10. 18 U.S.C. § 922(h)(1) (1976). To have committed a violation punishable under
this section, the firearm must have "been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign
commerce." Id. Such a determination was made by federal investigators prior to indict-
ment. 571 F.2d at 788.
11. E.g., United States ex rel. Santos v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 441 F.2d 1216 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1025 (1971). See Annot., 32 A.L.R. FED. 155, 162-64 (1977).
12. E.g., United States ex rel. Randazzo v. Follette, 282 F. Supp. 10 (S.D.N.Y. 1968),
aff'd on other grounds, 418 F.2d 1319 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 984 (1971);
People v. Hernandez, 229 Cal. App. 2d 143, 40 Cal. Rptr. 100 (1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S.
953 (1965). See Annot., 32 A.L.R. FED. 155, 164-70 (1977).
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ipation in a warrantless search of a parolee's home, and the quan-
tum of probable or reasonable cause required prior to initiation
of a warrantless search of a parolee's home.
In examining the effect of police participation on the validity
of parole searches, it is important to note that warrantless
searches by a parole officer of a parolee's person and premises are
often justified by the special relationship that exists between the
two. 13 Because this special relationship is nonexistent between a
police officer and a parolee, police must afford parolees the same
constitutional protections that are afforded ordinary citizens.
This distinction makes the role of police critical in determining
the validity of a warrantless search of a parolee. When police
officers are merely assisting, rather than directing, a parole officer
in conducting a warrantless search of a parolee's home, such as-
sistance will not invalidate the search. 4 In all but one reported
case, warrantless searches by parole officers, acting on their own
knowledge or suspicion have been held to be reasonable, even
though the parole officers were accompanied by police officers.' 5
Courts also differ greatly on the quantum of probable cause
that must be present to conduct a valid warrantless search of a
parolee's residence. The view of California courts, among others,
is that neither probable nor reasonable cause is required if the
parole officer coiducts the search in good faith, at a reasonable
hour, and in a manner that is not otherwise arbitrary or oppres-
sive.' 6 This approach, which offers the parolee protection from
only the most egregious fourth amendment violations, was
adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Latta v. Fitzharris.'7 The plural-
ity in Latta held that even a mere prior hunch can justify search
by a parole officer'" and that "[t]he parolee and his home are
subject to search by the parole officer when the officer reasonably
believes that such search is necessary in the performance of his
duties."' 9 This view is the least protective of the parolee's rights
13. Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246, 250 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 897 (1975).
14. E.g., United States ex rel. Santos v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 441 F.2d 1216 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1025 (1971). See Annot., 32 A.L.R. FED. 155, 177-81 (1977).
15. For the exception, see State v. Cullison, 173 N.W.2d 533 (Iowa), cert. denied,
398 U.S. 938 (1970).
16. E.g., United States ex rel. Randazzo v. Follette, 282 F. Supp. 10 (S.D.N.Y. 1968),
aff'd on other grounds, 418 F.2d 1319 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 984 (1971).
17. 521 F.2d 246 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 897 (1975).
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in the spectrum of those views advanced by the various jurisdic-
tions.
More protective is the majority view, that reasonable cause
is required to conduct a valid warrantless search of a parolee's
home.20 The standard announced in People v. Anderson2l requires
that the parole officer have "reasonable grounds to believe that
a parole violation has occurred. ' 2  In Anderson the court em-
ployed the rationale that "the parole authority must be vested
with the power to investigate a parolee to ascertain whether a
parole violation has occurred if it is to fulfill its statutory func-
tion." 2s Though falling far below the traditional probable cause
standard, this reasonable cause view does provide the parolee
with meaningful fourth amendment protection.
At the other, most protective, end of the spectrum, only one
jurisdiction prior to Bradley had indicated clearly that parolees
are protected by the same fourth amendment standards that pro-
tect other citizens. In State v. Cullison, 2 the Iowa Supreme Court
held that a parolee in Iowa loses only two constitutional rights:
to hold public office and to vote. The court thus implied that
parolees were afforded full fourth amendment protections. The
court, however, invalidated a search because "the pre-search rea-
sonable or probable cause, essential to its validity, was not pres-
ent or established," 2 not because a warrant was not obtained.
The distinction is critical because the Iowa court asserted that all
fourth amendment rights apply to parolees, but by its loose word-
ing, indicated that a warrantless search of a parolee might be held
valid if prior reasonable or probable cause exists. It may be ques-
tioned, therefore, whether the standard announced in Cullison
differs from that developed in Anderson. The final point that
should be made in examining the development of case law prior
to Bradley, is that no jurisdiction had held invalid a search con-
ducted by a parole officer alone, acting either on his personal
knowledge26 or on a tip from persons other than the police.
27
20. E.g., United States ex rel. Coleman v. Smith, 395 F. Supp. 1155 (W.D.N.Y. 1975);
People v. Anderson, 536 P.2d 302 (Colo. 1975). See Annot., 32 A.L.R. FED. 155, 168-70
(1977).
21. 536 P,2d 302 (Colo. 1975).
22. Id. at 305.
23. Id. For a discussion of other rationales employed by courts to justify stripping
parolees of their fourth amendment protections, see Note, supra note 5, at 704-20.
24. 173 N.W.2d 533 (Iowa), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 938 (1970).
25. Id. at 540.
26. E.g., People v. Anderson, 536 P.2d 302 (Colo. 1975); State v. Williams, 486
S.W.2d 468 (Mo. 1972). See Annot., 32 A.L.R. FED. 155, 221-28 (1977).
27. E.g., People v. Taylor, 253 Cal. App. 2d 574, 61 Cal. Rptr. 638 (1967). See Annot.,
[Vol. 30
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The question presented in Bradley was of first impression in
the Fourth Circuit. Though contrary to the great weight of deci-,
sions from other jurisdictions, the holding that a warrant is re-
quired to search a parolee's residence is not totally without sup-
port.2 The difficulty with the Bradley opinion is that the ratio-
nale of the court does not appear to be fully developed. A com-
plete understanding of both the plurality and dissenting opinions
of the Ninth Circuit in Latta is essential to establish a proper
framework for analyzing Bradley, because the Fourth Circuit
drew heavily from the dissent in that case.
In Latta a parole officer had reason to believe that Latta was
violating the terms of his parole and arrested him at the house of
an acquaintance.2 1 When arrested Latta was holding a pipe con-
taining marijuana. Six hours after the arrest, the parole officer,
accompanied by two police officers, conducted a warrantless
search of Latta's home, which was located approximately 30
miles from the scene of the arrest. Latta did not contend that the
parole officer was acting as "a stalking horse for the police."3 A
four and one-half pound brick of marijuana discovered during the
search was used in Latta's subsequent state conviction for posses-
sion with intent to distribute. A plurality of the court held that
searches of parolees must pass the fourth amendment standard
of reasonableness, 31 that the purposes of the parole system and
resultant duty of the parole officer may justify a search on less
than probable cause grounds, even on a hunch,12 and that a war-
rant was not required.3 In holding that a warrant was not re-
quired, the court drew support from Supreme Court cases that
upheld warrantless administrative searches, 3 and from the prop-
32 A.L.R. FED. 155, 228-29 (1977).
28. 521 F.2d at 246, 254-59 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting); White, The Fourth Amend-
ment Rights of Parolees and Probationers, 31 U. Prrr. L. REv. 167 (1969); Note, Striking
the Balance Between Privacy and Supervision: The Fourth Amendment and Parole and
Probation Officer Searches of Parolees and Probationers, 51 N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 800 (1976);
Note, Extending Search-and-Seizure Protection to Parolees in California, 22 STAN. L. REv.
129 (1969); Comment, Constitutional Law: Warrantless Parole Officer Searches-A New
Rationale, 60 MINN. L. REv. 805 (1976). See United States ex rel. Coleman v. Smith, 395
F. Supp. 1155, 1159 (W.D.N.Y. 1975).
29. The legality of the arrest was not questioned. 521 F.2d at 247.
30. Id. See text accompanying notes 13-15 supra.
31. 521 F.2d at 248-49.
32. Id. at 250.
33. Id.
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osition that the traditional authority of the parole officer coupled
with a minimum showing of cause before a magistrate would
reduce the warrant to a "paper tiger."3 The court also held that
because the search was not unreasonable in a constitutional
sense, the use of the evidence in a new criminal prosecution was
not proscribed.38
The plurality in Latta seemed to approach the problem back-
wards. It first determined the standards of reasonableness and
then determined whether a warrant was mandatory if those stan-
dards were met. The court in Bradley, incorporating Judge Huf-
stedler's dissent in Latta, took a more conventional approach by
ascertaining first whether a warrant was required.
Though not articulating each step of logic, the Fourth Circuit
apparently began with the proposition that a search conducted
without a warrant issued upon probable cause is "per se unrea-
sonable . . .subject only to a few specifically established and
well-delineated exceptions."37 Those exceptions to the warrant
requirement fall into three categories: "consent searches, a very
limited class of routine searches and certain searches conducted
under circumstances of haste that render the obtaining of a
search warrant impracticable."3 Absent one or more of these lim-
ited exceptions, the test is not solely whether the search was
reasonable, but whether it was reasonable to secure a warrant.39
With this groundwork established, the court in Bradley went on
to attack the various justifications for obviating the warrant re-
quirement that were offered by the plurality in Latta.
The Fourth Circuit found unpersuasive the argument of the
plurality in Latta that the special relationship between the
parolee and parole officer and society's interest in having the
parolee properly supervised obviated the need for a warrant.
Though it recognized the important governmental interests in-
volved, the court in Bradley denied that these interests provided
States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970). For a look at administrative searches in the noncriminal
context, see Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971) (home visit by a welfare caseworker).
35. 521 F.2d at 252.
36. Id.
37. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,454-55 (1971); Camara
v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967).
38. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 358
(1974).
39. 521 F.2d at 255-56 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 30
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adequate justification for abrogating the constitutional rights of
parolees."
The court in Bradley was equally unpersuaded by the at-
tempt of the plurality in Latta to analogize the warrantless search
of a parolee's home to the limited exceptions carved out of the
warrant requirement by the Supreme Court for administrative
inspections or searches."1 The general rule on whether a warrant
is required in an administrative search was announced in Camara
v. Municipal Court.'2 In Camara a health inspector was required
to inspect residences to ensure compliance with minimum hous-
ing standards. One resident denied the inspector entrance and
was subsequently convicted for refusing to allow the inspection.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a warrant was re-
quired when voluntary admittance was denied,"3 even though the
likelihood of abuse was small and the governmental interest in
securing minimum standards was great.
The Fourth Circuit also rejected the view of the plurality in
Latta that Camara was inapposite and that the parole cases were
controlled by the principles announced in Colonnade Catering
Corp. v. United States" and United States v. Biswell.1" In
Colonnade and Biswell, the Court announced a narrow exception
to the Camara rule: a warrant is not required when express statu-
tory authorization exists for a warrantless search" and when the
discretion of the administrative official is suitably restricted by
either the authorizing statute or an implementing regulation. 7
Though it conceded that parole searches might be similar to
administrative searches, the court in Bradley found an absence
of statutory authority or guidelines." Following the reasoning of
the dissent in Latta, the court concluded that judicial decisions
are inadequate substitutes for the missing statutes and regula-
tions." Parole searches, therefore, cannot be forced into the lim-
ited Colonnade-Biswell exception.
40. 571 F.2d at 790.
41. Id. at 789-90; see United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972); Colonnade Cater-
ing Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
42. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
43. Id. at 640.
44. 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
45. 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
46. In Biswell, the authorizing statute was 18 U.S.C. § 921 (1976). In Colonnade, the
authorizing statute was 26 U.S.C. § 5146(b) (1976).
47. 406 U.S. at 317-18.
48. 571 F.2d at 789.
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Cases other than those mentioned in Bradley and Lattasug-
gest additional reasons why Colonnade-Biswell cannot control. In
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States" the Supreme Court invalida-
ted a warrantless search by the Border Patrol of petitioner's auto-
mobile approximately twenty-five miles from the border. In so
doing, the Court rejected the government's contention that
Colonnade-Biswell, not Camara, should control. The Court reem-
phasized the requirement that a search be statutorily restricted
to escape the proscription of Camara: "The search in the present
case was conducted in the unfettered discretion of the members
of the Border Patrol, who did not have a warrant, probable cause,
or consent. The search thus embodied precisely the evil the Court
saw in Camara. . . ."" In the absence of a prior judicial determi-
nation of probable cause and the issuance of a suitably restricted
warrant, a parole officer could exercise the "unfettered discre-
tion" specifically rejected in Almeida-Sanchez. The court then
discussed the rationale behind the Colonnade-Biswell exception
to Camara by explaining that "[tihe businessman in a regulated
industry in effect consents to the restrictions placed upon him."5
2
While it can be argued by analogy that the parolee likewise con-
sents to parole searches, the contract-consent theory, which for-
merly was advanced by courts in abridging the fourth amend-
ment rights of parolees, has been widely discredited and aban-
doned.5 3 It is untenable to suggest that the contract-consent
theory, one of questionable constitutional validity,54 could be res-
urrected by forcing parole searches into the Colonnade-Biswell
mold.
Since Bradley was decided, the Supreme Court again has
refused to expand the exceptions to Camara. In Marshall v. Bar-
low's, Inc.55 the Court held that warrantless inspections made
pursuant to section 8(a) of the Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 197056 were unconstitutional. The Court determined that
inspections of businesses that are not licensed or otherwise regu-
lated cannot be justified as "responses to [the] relatively unique
50. 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
51. Id. at 270.
52. Id. (emphasis added).
53. Comment, supra note 28, at 807. For a discussion of the three traditional theories
of parole and their weaknesses, see Note, supra note 5, at 703-20.
54. See Note, supra note 5, at 709.
55. Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
56. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, § 8(a), 29 U.S.C. § 657(a) (1976).
820 [Vol. 30
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circumstances"57 present in Colonnade and Biswell. As the Su-
preme Court further restricts the Camara exceptions, it becomes
increasingly doubtful that warrantless searches by a parole offi-
cer, even if authorized by a properly limited statute, could fit
within the narrow confines of Colonnade and Biswell.58
In holding that the warrant requirement is applicable to
searches of a parolee's home, the court in Bradley did not decide
what showing of cause would be necessary to secure the warrant."
The court stated, "we do not imply that the probable cause for a
warrant to search a parolee's person or home is as demanding as
the probable cause for a warrant to search a suspect's person or
home in an ordinary criminal investigation."" The question that
remains is what standard the court will adopt when confronted
squarely with the issue. The first of two possibilities is that the
court will adopt the balance of interests approach offered by the
dissent in Latta" that' "theoretically demands a sliding scale of
probability standard, varying with the level of intrusion in each
type of situation. ' 6 2 This flexible probable cause theory, though
not receiving uniform support, has been developed by the Su-
preme Court in both Camara and, in the criminal context, in the
Terry v. Ohio,63 stop-and-frisk line of cases. In the context of
parole searches, the balance of interests approach would be simi-
lar to the current majority view that reasonable cause is a condi-
tion precedent to a warrantless search of a parolee's home by his
parole officer."'
The second possibility is the traditional probable cause stan-
dard with a parolee's past providing only one factor in the deter-
mination of probable cause.
Just as a past arrest record is one factor which courts consider
in determining whether probable cause existed for an arrest or
57. 436 U.S. at 313.
58. It may be questioned whether any other business or activity may ever join
Colonnade and Biswell as exceptions to the general rule of Camara. The Court indicates,
without identifying the industry, that there may be such additional businesses or activi-
ties. Id. at 321.
59. 571 F.2d at 788 & n.1.
60. Id.
61. 521 F.2d at 256-57 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting).
62. Greenberg, The Balance of Interests Theory and the Fourth Amendment: A
Selective Analysis of Supreme Court Action since Camara and See, 61 CAuF. L. REv. 1011,
1016 (1973).
63. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). For a discussion of the flexible or variable probable cause
theory, see Greenberg, supra note 62, at 1016.
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search, so a parolee's criminal history can supply one factor to
be taken into account in deciding whether normal probable
cause standards have been met in a particular parole-officer
search."
This theory undoubtedly provides the parolee with greater pro-
tection than the balance of interests approach. These protections,
however, as indicated by the development of the flexible probable
cause standard by the Supreme Court, are not constitutionally
mandated and would unduly hamper the supervisory functions
and efficiency of the parole officer, forcing him to divert his ener-
gies to police investigative work." When faced squarely with the
issue, the Fourth Circuit is likely to adopt the flexible probable
cause approach, rather than adhering to the traditional probable
cause standard in the issuance of search warrants for a parolee's
residence.
Given that a warrant is required, absent exigent circumstan-
ces, to conduct a legal search of a parolee's home, what should
the remedy for noncompliance be? In reversing Bradley's convic-
tion, the Fourth Circuit summarily determined that the denial of
fourth amendment protections in the present case mandated ex-
clusion of the evidence in a new criminal prosecution. Use of the
evidence for parole revocation was not in issue. Since Bradley was
decided, the Fourth Circuit, in United States v. Workman,6" has
extended application of the exclusionary rule to federal probation
revocation hearings. In Workman the federal probation officer
obtained evidence that the probationer possessed an illegal distil-
lery, which constituted a violation of his probation conditions.
This evidence was obtained without a warrant but with probable
cause. Relying primarily on Bradley, the court concluded that the
warrantless search was illegal and the fruits of the search could
not be used at a probation revocation hearing. In light of the
Workman decision, the Fourth Circuit apparently would have
applied the exclusionary rule to Bradley's parole revocation hear-
ing, had the court been presented with the issue. 8
65. Note, supra note 28, at 136.
66. See generally Newman, Concepts of Treatment in Probation and Parole
Supervision, 25 FED. PROBATION 11 (March 1961).
67. 585 F.2d 1205 (4th Cir. 1978).
68. The Court in Bradley was not presented with the issue. 571 F.2d at 790 n.6.
Further development of case law concerning probationers, probation officers and proba-
tion revocation proceedings is beyond the scope of this case comment. Workman, there-
fore, will be considered only for its development and extension of the decision in Bradley.
[Vol. 30
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Because other, though less attractive, remedies for noncom-
pliance with the warrant requirement were available to the
Fourth Circuit," the application of the exclusionary rule to both
parole revocation hearings and new criminal prosecutions merits
some examination. The primary purpose of the exclusionary rule
is to deter official conduct inconsistent with fourth amendment
protections by removing the incentive for such misconduct-the
use of illegally gathered evidence in criminal prosecutions." "The
exclusionary rule is simply a tool to be employed in whatever
manner is necessary to achieve the amendment's regulatory
objective by reducing undesirable incentives to unconstitutional
searches and seizures,"'" for without the rule the fourth amend-
ment would be reduced to "a form of words."" The Supreme
Court, however, has refused to apply the exclusionary rule when
the deterrent effect would be incremental at best.7 3
The application of the above principles to cases involving
parole searches weighs heavily in favor of invoking the exclusion-
ary rule.74 Whether a parole officer perceives himself as one who
helps and aids the rehabilitation of the parolee,75 or as a
policeman-enforcer,76 substantial deterrent benefits can be real-
ized.
Conscientious parole officers will not be greatly impeded in
their daily routines and will, when a parole violation is reported
or suspected, protect the constitutional rights of their charges by
securing a proper warrant. In the instance of an overzealous pa-
69. E.g., a civil damages action brought under the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1976). For an example of a § 1983 action brought by a parolee and his family, see Diaz
v. Ward, 437 F. Supp. 678 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
70. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949);
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The court in Workman expanded the mean-
ing of "criminal prosecutions" to include all "criminal adjudicative proceedings," which
include revocation proceedings. 585 F.2d at 1209-11.
71. Amsterdam, supra note 38, at 437.
72. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
73. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338
(1974).
74. Application of the exclusionary rule, though placing an added burden on the
parole officer, does not mean that the officer must procure a warrant before each visit or
risk exclusion of any subsequently seized evidence. No warrant is required when the visit
is truly "routine" and there is no prior reason to believe a parole violation is taking place.
Officers who discover a violation while conducting routine visits may act as any police
officer would in exigent circumstances, 585 F.2d at 1208, "with the substantial advantage
that the parole officer, unlike a policeman, can gain warrantless entry for visiting pur-
poses." 521 F.2d at 258 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting).
75. 521 F.2d at 249.
76. Id. at 258 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting).
11
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role officer, the deterrence of the warrant requirement will be
most effective. If the officer wishes to have his parolee incarcer-
ated for a suspected parole violation, the procedural safeguards
announced in Bradley as extended by Workman must be fol-
lowed. Noncompliance would result in exclusion of the evidence
from both a new criminal prosecution and a parole revocation
hearing. The holding in Bradley, as extended by Workman, sup-
ports application of the exclusionary rule by advancing its major
policy consideration, safeguarding fourth amendment protec-
tions. t
On balance, the decision of the Fourth Circuit in Bradley
may prove to be both a boon and a disappointmment in the
development of greater fourth amendment protections for pa-
rolees. Bradley is to be lauded for recognizing that efforts to
maintain a viable parole system neither justify nor necessitate
minimizing the fourth amendment rights of parolees. The unfor-
tunate aspect of Bradley is that its strength is in the holding, not
in the opinion as a whole. Because the opinion itself is exceed-
ingly .brief and incomplete in its reasoning, courts of other juris-
dictions may well be reluctant to cite Bradley with force and
authority. Reappraisal of the constitutional rights of parolees,
however, has been long overdue. Hopefully the foothold provided
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - HISTORIC PRESERVATION BY MEANS
OF LANDmARK DESIGNATION. Penn Central Transportation Co. v.
New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City' the
United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
New York City's Landmark Preservation Law2 as applied to
Grand Central Terminal. In applying the ordinance, the city had
refused to allow Penn Central to construct a fifty-five story office
building on top of the Terminal, a structure of French Beaux Arts
design that first opened in 1913. 3 The decision has been heralded
as a victory for individuals and organizations interested in pre-
serving buildings having historical or architectural significance.'
Nevertheless everyone interested in the cause of historic preserva-
tion should read the Supreme Court's decision narrowly and with
caution for if the exact posture of this case as it reached our
nation's highest court is not borne in mind, preservationists may
receive great disappointments in the future.
Penn Central Transportation Company did not raise the
underlying issue of whether preservation of structures having his-
toric or architectural significance was a permissible or appropri-
ate objective for the city of New York. The Supreme Court stated
specifically that this question was not an issue in the case.5 Penn
Central's position, both in the New York courts and the United
States Supreme Court, was that the method of preservation cho-
sen by the city was unconstitutional because it was a taking of
property without just compensation. Future litigants, therefore,
will still be faced with this threshold question.
To understand the Court's decision, the development of his-
toric preservation in the United States must first be examined.
Preservation of the nation's cultural resources has been a concern
at the federal level since the effort in the late nineteenth century
to preserve the Gettysburg battlefield as a national monument,6
and has been the subject of several congressional enactments,7
1. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
2. NEw YORK, N.Y. ADMiN. CODE §§ 205-1.0 to 207-21.0 (1965). For text of ordinance,
see 4 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING, § 30.86 (2d ed. 1977).
3. 366 N.E.2d 1271, 1273, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914, 916 (1977).
4. We Won-Supreme Court Rules in Favor of Grand Central Terminal,
PRESERVATION NEWS, August 1978, at 1, col. 1-2.
5. 438 U.S. at 129.
6. See United States v. Gettysburg Electric Ry., 160 U.S. 668 (1896).
7. Fowler, Federal Historic Preservation Law: National Historic Preservation Act,
13
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including one specifically on passenger railroad terminals.8 All
fifty states have legislation on historic preservation and some
state constitutions provide for historic preservation.9
Many reasons have been advanced for historic preservation.
Many of the ordinances creating historic districts have been justi-
fied because of the districts' commercial importance and relation
to the tourist industry."0 One ordinance lists as purposes of the
city's historic districts'the economic and general welfare of the
people, the preservation of property values, and the attraction of
tourists and residents." Historic preservation has also been justi-
fied and advocated for reasons more intangible than economic
importance. Historic structures have been deemed useful as edu-
cational tools that can significantly augment textbooks, as in the
use of house museums to teach social history. Historic structures
have also been said to improve the quality of life, provide lessons
from the past, capture priceless aspects of American heritage,
provide examples of excellence for the present," create a sense of
satisfaction and pride within society, and give individuals a feel-
ing of continuity with their past. '3 In the National Historic Pres-
ervation Act of 1966," Congress stated that an important reason
for historic preservation is the "sense of orientation" it gives to
the American people.'
5
State statutes and city ordinances commonly create historic
districts and regulate the use and alteration of all property within
the district. To perpetuate its pre-1860 architecture, the city of
Charleston, South Carolina, passed an ordinance in 1931 that
created the first historic district in the United States. 6 This ordi-
nance was passed pursuant to a South Carolina enabling statute
Executive Order 11593 and Other Developments in Federal Law, 12 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
31(1976).
8. Amtrak Improvement Act of 1974, 49 U.S.C. § 1653(i) (1976).
9. Wilson & Winkler, The Response of State Legislation to Historic Preservation, 36
LAW & CoNrENP. PROB. 329, 330 (1971).
10. E.g., Maher v. City of New Orleans, 371 F. Supp. 653 (E.D. La. 1974), affl'd, 516
F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1975); City of New Orleans v. Pergament, 198 La. 852, 5 So. 2d 129
(1941); Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 333 Mass. 783, 128 N.E.2d 563 (1955); City
of Santa Fe v. Gamble Skogmo, Inc., 73 N.M. 410, 389 P.2d 13 (1964).
11. Charleston, S.C., Zoning Ord. Art. Im, § 51-22 (1966).
12. 438 U.S. at 108.
13. Note, Urban Landmarks: Preserving our Cities' Aesthetic and Cultural
Resources, 39 ALB. L. Rzv. 521, 524 (1975).
14. 16 U.S.C. § 470 (1976).
15. Id.
16. Note, supra note 13, at 523. See, e.g., New Orleans, La., Ord. No. 14,538 (1937);
Charleston, S.C., Zoning Ord. Art. V, §§ 42-46 (1931).
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that gave cities the power to regulate the construction and use of
buildings and land in promotion of the health, safety, morals and
general welfare of the community. 7 Several authors have sug-
gested that state statutes that enable municipalities to create
historic districts are an effective way to promote historic preser-
vation; s these ordinances may be less useful, however, in preserv-
ing individual urban landmarks.'9
Legislation to preserve individual landmarks differs from
historic districting in that historic districting functions almost
like zoning by regulating the use of property within a wide area.
In contrast, landmarks legislation classifies individual pieces of
property to be regulated according to their historical and archi-
tectural significance; therefore, the properties that are regulated
as landmarks may be scattered throughout a city."0 The operation
of a landmarks law to restrict individual properties in ways that
are not applicable to neighboring land may lead to claims that
the ordinance denies landmark owners equal protection." Preser-
vationists, however, believe that these individual landmarks need
protection. By 1970 over half of the 12,000 buildings listed by the
federal government in its Historic American Buildings Survey,
begun in 1933, had been demolished. 2 High land values in urban
areas make city landmarks especially vulnerable to demolition.
The stubborn reality underlying the landmarks dilemma is that
landmark ownership in downtown areas of high land value is
markedly less profitable than redevelopment of landmark sites.
Hence there is an incessant trade-off - injurious to the urban
environment - of buildings of unique architectural distinction
for glass and steel towers that are crammed with as much renta-
l7. Stevenson v. Board of Adjustment, 230 S.C. 440, 444, 96 S.E.2d 456, 457 (1957).
The holding is now codified in S.C. CODE ANN. § 5-23-10 (1976). See generally Rebman
v. City of Springfield, 111 Ill. App. 2d 430, 250 N.E.2d 282 (1969) and Note, Legal Tech-
niques for Preservation of Historic Property, 55 VA. L. REv. 302 (1969) for a discussion of
the relationship of preservation to the general welfare.
18. Note, supra note 13, at 522-24; Note, supra note 17, at 310-12.
19. Costonis, The Chicago Plan: Incentive Zoning and the Preservation of Urban
Landmarks, 85 HARV. L. REV. 574, 582 (1972).
20. Regarding the economic advantages of zoning and districting not available with
landmarks, see Maher v. City of New Orleans, 371 F. Supp. 653 (E.D. La. 1974), affl'd,
516 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1975); City of New Orleans v. Pergament, 198 La. 852, 5 So. 2d
129 (1941); Note, supra note 13; Comment, Landmark Preservation: The Problem of the
Single Landmark-Lutheran Church in America v. City of New York, 25 DEPAuL L. REv.
160, 163-64 (1975).
21. Costonis, supra note 19, at 602 n.93 (1972).
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ble floor area as local zoning permits and as the market will
absorb. 2
Many of these old buildings are suited to a lifestyle that is out-
moded, yet they are not easily adapted to a new use. This prob-
lem is compounded by the continual rise in property taxes.4
Unfortunately, acquisition of landmarks by local govern-
ments through the power of eminent domain is unlikely. In addi-
tion to the costs of acquisition and the loss of tax revenues when
the property is taken out of private hands, maintenance may be
expensive; 25 consequently, landmark preservation generally re-
ceives low priority in municipal goals and budgets.28 Further-
more, private owners' continued operation of historic buildings as
economically viable parts of the community may be preferable to
government ownership and operation as museums.? In addition
to the development of historic preservation, some of the more
unusual features of New York City's Landmark Preservation
Law, the situation of Penn Central, and the particular issues
actually before the Supreme Court must be examined to under-
stand the impact that Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New
York City will have on future controversies between property
owners and preservationists, and on the future power of landmark
commissions.
New York City's Landmark Preservation Law2s (Landmarks
Law) was passed in 19652 pursuant to an enabling statute passed
by the New York Legislature.?0 It provides for the creation of a
Landmarks Commission composed of eleven persons including
three architects, one historian, one realtor, and one city planner
or landscape architect.31 The stated purpose of the city ordinance
is to prevent further irreparable loss of the many structures of
architectural excellence produced during various periods of the
city's history.
23. Costonis, supra note 19, at 575. See also Note, Use of Zoning Restrictions to
Restrain Property Owners from Altering or Destroying Historic Landmarks, 1975 DUKE.
L.J. 999.
24. Note, supra note 13, at 525.
25. Lutheran Church v. City of New York, 35 N.Y.2d 121, 134, 316 N.E.2d 305, 313,
359 N.Y.S.2d 7, 18 (1974) (Jasen, J., dissenting).
26. Costonis, supra note 19, at 582 n.33, 583.84.
27. 438 U.S. at 109 n.6.
28. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE §§ 205-1.0 to 207-21.0 (1965).
29. 2 R. ANDERSON, AMEiucAN LAW OF ZoNING, § 9.70 (2d ed. 1977).
30. N.Y. GEN. MuN. LAw § 96a (McKinney 1977).
31. NEW YoRK, N.Y., ADmiN. CODE § 205 (1965).
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It is the sense of the council that the standing of this city as a
worldwide tourist center and world capital of business, culture,
and government cannot be maintained or enhanced by disre-
garding the historical and architectural heritage of the city and
by countenancing the destruction of such cultural assets.
32
The ordinance further declares that preservation of these struc-
tures is "a public necessity and required in the interest of the
health, prosperity, safety and welfare of the people."'
33
The Landmarks Commission has the power, after public
hearings on the matter, to designate as landmarks34 structures
that meet the statutory definition.-" This designation is subject
to judicial review at the owner's request."6 Following designation
of a building as a landmark it is unlawful to alter, reconstruct,
or demolish the structure without first obtaining from the Land-
marks Commission a certificate approving the alteration.3
The ordinance provides for three types of certificates. A cer-
tificate of "no exterior effect" is granted if the commission deter-
mines that the proposed construction will not change or affect the
architectural features, or be out of harmony with the character
of the landmark.s A certificate of "appropriateness" is granted
if the commission determines that the proposed alteration would
not be inconsistent with the purposes of the ordinance. 39 The
third type of certificate may issue when an owner of nontax-
exempt property requests a certificate of "appropriateness au-
thorizing demolition, alterations or reconstruction on ground of
insufficient return." For this certificate the owner establishes
that his property is incapable of producing a reasonable return on
his investment, and shows that he is in good faith seeking ap-
proval for alteration of the landmark to make the property eco-
nomically productive. The commission must develop a plan to
alleviate the hardship," which the owner may accept or reject.4'
32. Id. § 205-1.0a.
33. Id. § 205-1.0b.
34. Id. § 207-2.0a(1).
35. Id. § 207-1.0k defines a landmark as "[a]ny improvement, any part of which is
30 years or older, which has a special character or special historical or aesthetic interest
or value as part of the development, heritage, or cultural characteristics of the city, state,
or nation ....
36. 438 U.S. at 132-33.
37. NEw YORK, N.Y., ArMIN. CODE §§ 207-4.0 to 207-8.0 (1965).
38. Id. § 207-5.0.
39. Id. § 207-6.0.
40. Id. § 207-8.0b.
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If he rejects the plan, the city must either acquire the property
by eminent domain or issue a "notice to proceed" with the altera-
tion.42 If the property has received full or partial exemption from
payment of real property tax for the preceeding three years, how-
ever, this third alternative is not available, except in a few situa-
tions. 3 One of the unusual features of the Landmarks Law is a
provision for "transferable development rights."44 This provision
allows owners who have not developed their property to the extent
allowed by the zoning laws to transfer their authorized but un-
used rights to develop that space to nearby pieces of property that
they own. Consequently, an owner may build larger or taller
structures on the second site than would otherwise be allowed by
applicable zoning restrictions."
Penn Central should be viewed in light of the historical de-
velopment of landmarks preservation and the legal framework of
the ordinance. In 1967, following a public hearing, Grand Central
Terminal was designated as a landmark over the objection of its
owner, Penn Central Transportation Company. The Landmarks
Commission found that the Terminal was
a magnificent example of French Beaux Arts architecture; that
it is one of the great buildings of America, that it represents a
creative engineering solution of a very difficult problem, com-
bined with artistic splendor; that as an American Railroad Sta-
tion it is unique in quality, distinction and character; and that
this building plays a significant role in the life and development
of New York City.4
42. Id. § 207-8.0g.
43. Id. § 207-8.0. Subsection (2) specifies that if the tax exemption is received pur-
suant to one of several sections of the Real Property Tax Law, and the applicant meets
certain other requirements, this alternative is still available.
44. NEW YORK, N.Y., ZONING REsoLUrION art. I, ch. 2, § 12-10 (1978), cited in Penn
Central Transp. Co. v. N.Y. City, 438 U.S. 104, 114 (1978).
45. Costonis, The Disparity Issue: A Context for the Grand Central Terminal
Decision, 91 HARv. L. REV. 402 (1977). The author discusses the social aspect of property
value which was accepted in the N.Y. Court of Appeals decision of this case. For other
articles discussing transferable development rights, see Costonis, Development Rights
Transfer: An Exploratory Essay, 83 YALE L.J. 75 (1973); Note, The Unconstitutionality
of Transferable Development Rights, 84 YALE L.J. 1101 (1975); Note, Development Rights
Transfer in New York City, 82 YALE L.J. 338, 349-59 (1972).
46. 50 A.D.2d 265, 270, 377 N.Y.S.2d 20, 25 (1975). Photographs of the Terminal may
be found in T. WRENN & E. MuLLoy, ArmEucA's FOROTTm ARcHrrEcTUR 24-25 (1976).
Cf. N.Y.L.J., Jan. 23, 1975, at 16, col. 3 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. County) (expressing a less
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Judicial review of the commission's decision was available, but
Penn Central did not pursue it. 7
The following year, Penn Central entered into a lease with a
British corporation, UPG Properties, Inc., allowing UPG to con-
struct an office building on top of the Terminal. Pursuant to the
requirements of the Landmarks Law,48 Penn Central and UPG
submitted for approval plans drawn by Marcel Breuer and Asso-
ciates.49 The first plan, known as Breuer I,-° would not have al-
tered any of the existing facades of the building and had the
merits, in the commission's words, of enhancing "the exterior
. . .by providing a quieter and more dignified base to support
the monumental columns .. . [and] would unquestionably
improve pedestrian access to the. . . subway."5' The commission
ultimately denied applications for both "no exterior effect" and
"appropriateness" certificates stating that while it had
no fixed rule against making additions to designated buildings
- it all depends on how they are done .... But to balance a
55-story office tower above a flamboyant Beaux-Arts facade
seems nothing more than an aesthetic joke. Quite simply, the
tower would overwhelm the Terminal by its sheer mass....
[It] would reduce the Landmark itself to the status of a curios-
ity.s2
A second plan, which called for stripping some of the architec-
tural features of the Terminal, was given less serious attention
and certificates of approval were denied. 3 Although Penn Central
could have appealed the denial of each certificate, it did not seek
judicial review of either of them, but rather chose to file suit in
the New York Supreme Court alleging a taking of its property
47. 438 U.S. at 116.
48. NEW YORK, N.Y., AmimN. CODE § 207-4.0c(2).
49. This well known architectural firm has received numerous awards for its distinc-
tive designs. Justice Lupiano of the New York Supreme Court believed that the firm's
reputation and the design plan of Breuer I to preserve the south facade of the Terminal
evidenced Penn Central's good faith effort to preserve the Terminal while making the
property profitable for the corporation. 50 A.D.2d 265, 276, 377 N.Y.S.2d 20, 31 (1976)
(Lupiano, J., dissenting).
50. For an artistic sketch of this proposal, see PRESERVATON NEWS, April 1978, at 1,
col. 1-2.
51. 50 A.D. 2d at 276, 377 N.Y.S.2d at 31 (Lupiano, J., dissenting).
52. 438 U.S. at 117-18.
53. Id. The commission stated: "To protect a landmark, one does not tear it down.
To perpetuate its architectural features, one does not strip them off." Record at 2255. For
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without just compensation.54
The Trial Term of the New York Supreme Court found that
the Landmarks Law constituted a taking of private property for
public use without just compensation. It also found denials of
both equal protection and due process5 because the Landmarks
Law created, without any apparent reason, three classifications
of property for purposes of administrative relief.56 Penn Central
receives a tax exemption for its passenger railroad property.57 The
owner of a nontax-exempt landmark may apply for a certificate
of appropriateness on the ground of insufficient return. If he
meets the requirements of the ordinance, the commission must
offer him a plan for relief from the hardship. If he refuses the
offer, the commission must either condemn the landmark or issue
a notice to proceed with the alteration. This provision is not gen-
erally available to tax-exempt property, unless specifically listed
as an exception in the ordinance. The exceptions cover religious,
charitable, cultural and public service organizations," but do not
include those receiving the tax exemption for passenger railroad
property received by Penn Central. Hence, owners of nontax-
exempt property and twenty-three categories of tax-exempt prop-
erty are eligible for relief under this section. Owners of tax-
exempt property that is not within an exception, including Penn
Central, are not eligible for any relief from the economic burdens
created by designation of their property as landmarks. 59 These
classifications were held to violate the principles of due process
and equal protection.
The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court ap-
plied the test it uses in zoning cases, that is, whether the comn-
plainants had been deprived of all beneficial use of their property
54. 438 U.S. at 119.
55. The trial term's holding was discussed by the majority and the dissent in Penn
Central Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 50 A.D. 2d 265, 377 N.Y.S.2d 20 (1975).
56. 50 A.D. 2d at 288, 377 N.Y.S.2d at 41 (Lupiano, J., dissenting).
57. Grand Central Terminal receives a partial real estate tax exemption under N.Y.
REAL PROP. TAx LAW § 489-ff (McKinney 1972). See 50 A.D. 2d at 271, 377 N.Y.S.2d at
26 (1975).
58. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADsm. CODE § 207-8.0(2) provides that an owner of tax-exempt
property may receive relief for insufficient return if the tax exemption is received
"pursuant to §§ 420, 422, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 430, 432, 434, 436, 438, 440, 442, 444,
450, 452, 462, 464, 468, 470, 472, or 474 of the Real Property Tax Law" and if the owner
meets certain other conditions.
59. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMAiN. CODE § 207-8.0. For a discussion of the differences in
treatment of taxable and tax-exempt property under this provision, see Comment, Legal
Methods of Historic Preservation, 19 BUFFALO L. REv. 611, 631-38 (1970).
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so that they were incapable of earning a reasonable return from
their property. The court reversed the decision of the trial term,
holding that Penn Central had not established that the applica-
tion of the Landmarks Law to its property imposed a sufficient
burden to constitute a compensable taking of property. 0 This
decision was affirmed by the New York Court of Appealsu and
ultimately by the United States Supreme Court. 2
The issue of whether no further administrative relief for tax-
exempt property constituted denials of equal protection and due
process was not raised at subsequent levels of the appellate pro-
cesses. If this issue had been raised, the United States Supreme
Court might have found that the commission could not constitu-
tionally prevent owners of tax-exempt property from demolishing
unprofitable buildings. The Court indicated that owners of tax-
exempt property do have available judicial relief if their property
cannot produce a "reasonable return. 6 3 Furthermore, "[tihe
city conceded at oral argument that if appellants can demon-
strate at some point in the future that circumstances have
changed such that the Terminal ceases to be, in the city council's
words, 'economically viable,' appellants may obtain relief."6" The
Court seemed to consider remote the possibility that the commis-
sion and the state courts would require an owner to maintain
without alteration a patently unprofitable landmark.
The only issue actually decided by the Supreme Court was
that Penn Central's property had not been taken unconstitu-
tionally. In deciding this issue, the Court considered "the severity
of the impact of the law on appellants' parcel" by making "a
careful assessment of the impact of the regulation on the Ter-
minal site."65 Because the Court found that no taking had oc-
curred, it did not have to decide whether the transferable devel-
opment rights alone would constitute just compensation to Penn
Central. 6
The Supreme Court distinguished this case from others in
60. 50 A.D.2d 265, 377 N.Y.S.2d 20 (1975). Comment, Grand Central Station-
Landmark at the End of the Line, or End of the Line for Landmarks?-New York City's
Landmark Law in the Courts, 37 U. Prrr. L. Rav. 81 (1975) discusses the trial term's
decision and several other cases arising under the city's Landmarks Law.
61. 42 N.Y.2d 324, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1977).
62. 438 U.S. 104.
63. Id. at 112-13 n.13.
64. Id. at 138 n.36 (referring to Tr. of Oral Arg. 42-43).
65. Id. at 136.
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which plaintiffs claimed takings of their property without just
compensation by noting that the Landmarks Law "does not inter-
fere in any way with the present uses of the Terminal."6 While
the Court is correct in its observation that Penn Central may,
consonant with the restrictions now imposed on the Terminal,
continue to use the Terminal as a railroad station, it is debatable
whether the Terminal as originally constructed is adequately
suited to the kinds of railroad traffic it serves today."
Penn Central had suffered losses in recent years that ulti-
mately rendered it bankrupt. The lease with UPG was an effort
to increase revenues from the Terminal. 9 For purposes of appeal
to the Supreme Court, however, Penn Central admitted that the
Terminal was capable of earning a reasonable return on its invest-
ment and that the transferable development rights were valua-
ble. 0 These admissions may have been crucial to the Court's
determination that the impact of the law on Penn Central's prop-
erty was not severe enough to constitute a taking. The Landmarks
Law defines "reasonable return" generally as a six percent annual
return on the assessed valuation currently set by the city. Be-
cause Penn Central did not raise the issue, the Supreme Court
did not discuss whether this was actually a reasonable return for
commercial property in New York City. The effect of Penn Cen-
tral's failure to raise these issues on appeal to the Supreme Court
is obvious in the Court's statement that "[o]ur holding today is
on the present record which in turn is based on Penn Central's
present ability to use the Terminal for its intended purposes and
in a gainful fashion."72 "[W]e must regard the New York City
law as permitting Penn Central not only to profit from the Ter-
67. Id. at 136.
68. Grand Central was built in an age when railroads were a popular and primary
mode of long.distance passenger travel. Now, the Terminal's passenger traffic is largely
confined to commuters whose rush hour onslaughts cannot safely be accommodated.
Interview with Frederick M. Gertz, Assist. Prof. of Law at the Univ. of S.C. School of Law,
in Columbia, S.C. (Sept. 1978).
69. 50 A.D.2d 265, 270, 377 N.Y.S.2d 20, 26 (1975).
70. 438 U.S. at 129. In his dissent to the decision of the New York Supreme Court,
Justice Lupiano discussed the profitability of the Terminal and questioned whether these
rights are actually of any value to Penn Central. 50 A.D. 2d at 277-84, 377 N.Y.S.2d at
33-38 (Lupiano, J., dissenting).
71. NEw YORK, N.Y. ADMN. CODE § 207-1.0. This general definition is subject to
exceptions and changes by the Landmarks Commission. Professor Gertz, supra note 68,
suggests that this is substantially below the expectations of acommercial property owner
in New York City.
72. 438 U.S. at 138 n.36.
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minal but to obtain a 'reasonable return' on its investment. '7 3
Had Penn Central presented the details of its financial situation
and the costs of maintaining the Terminal, the Court might have
found that the burden imposed by designation under the city's
Landmarks Law constituted a taking of property without just
compensation.
In the opinion of the Supreme Court, Penn Central had exag-
gerated the degree of interference with its air rights above the
Terminal occasioned by the commission's refusal to approve the
proposed construction. One reason given by the Court for its opin-
ion was that the commission never told Penn Central that any
construction above the Terminal would be prohibited. 4 The origi-
nal design for the Terminal included a twenty-story office tower
and the foundation was designed Jo include columns to support
such a tower, although it was never built.7 5 Because the commis-
sion's report stressed that construction of an addition above the
Terminal would be approved if it were in harmony with the
character and scale of the landmark, there was no reason to
suppose that the commission would not approve an addition
similar to the one proposed in the original plans. Penn Central,
however, did not submit plans for any structure smaller than
fifty-three stories and, therefore, the Court did not need to decide
what the company's rights would be in another situation .
7
The second reason the Court believed Penn Central had ex-
aggerated the impact of the commission's finding on its air rights
was that "[t]heir ability to use these rights has not been abro-
gated; they are made transferable . . . . 7 The Supreme Court
did not consider whether these transferable development rights
would be just compensation to Penn Central if a taking had oc-
curred. Rather, the Supreme Court considered these transferable
development rights as a factor mitigating any financial burdens
imposed on Penn Central by designation of the Terminal as a
landmark and, therefore, as a factor to be considered in the sever-
ity of the impact of the Landmarks Law on the property.78 Be-
73. Id. at 136.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 115.
76. Id. at 137. The company is now considering applying for approval of a smaller
structure, as well as selling the transferable development rights. PRSERVATION NEWs,
August 1978, at 1, col. 2, at 8, col. 1.
77. 438 U.S. at 137.




Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
cause Penn Central did not argue that these rights were not valu-
able, the Court assumed that they were, and found that no taking
had occurred.79
One of Penn Central's major contentions was that the law
created unconstitutional spot zoning. 0 Penn Central argued that
because of the lack of physical proximity between New York
City's hundreds of landmarks, the burdens and benefits of the law
could not be distributed fairly, unlike cases of zoning or historic
districting. The majority was correct, however, in distinguishing
the Landmarks Law from spot zoning because the city has a
comprehensive plan for the preservation of historic structures
that categorizes buildings by their architectural merit, rather
than by location, as is characteristic of zoning. The fact that over
four hundred landmarks and thirty-one historic districts are now
protected under the law suggests that the city does indeed have
a comprehensive plan, and is not merely imposing arbitrary re-
strictions."1
Several factors make this case appear to be a victory for the
New York City Landmarks Commission and the preservationists.
Significantly, it is the first case decided by the United States
Supreme Court on historic preservation and landmarks legisla-
tion. In addition, the definition of "reasonable return" set by
statute is fairly low, particularly because Grand Central Ter-
minal is in a city where land and air rights are-extremely valua-
ble. Furthermore, the value of the lease for the proposed tower -
a minimum of $3,000,000 per year 2 - was quite substantial,
especially for a company trying to recover from bankruptcy.
On the other hand, the transferable development rights,
which the Court viewed as mitigating the impact of the New York
City Landmarks Law, are not available in a majority of American
cities. The issue actually before the Court was very narrow:
whether taking of property had occurred-because the Landmarks
Commission rejected Penn Central's proposal to construct a fifty-
development rights just to benefit Penn Central, see 2 RoHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE
CONTROLS 7-23 (1978).
79. 438 U.S. at 129 and 137.
80. Spot zoning is usually defined as zoning that singles out a parcel for different,
more favorable treatment than that afforded surrounding land; the definition used by the
Supreme Court of "less favorable treatment" is less frequently used. 2 RATHKOPF, THE LAW
OF PLANNING AND ZONING 26-4 (2d ed. 1977). See generally Note, Public Regulation of Land
Use in South Carolina, 10 S.C.L.Q. 485, 490-94 (1958).
81. 438 U.S. at 134.
82. Id. at 116.
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five story office tower atop the Terminal. The Court decided that
"the New York law is not rendered invalid by its failure to provide
'just compensation' whenever a landmark owner is restricted in
the exploitation of property interests, such as air rights, to a
greater extent than provided for under applicable zoning laws. 8 3
The Court gave no indication of how it would decide if Penn
Central subsequently petitioned the commission for permission to
demolish the Terminal. It merely held that the value of the trans-
ferable rights helped to mitigate the loss to Penn Central and that
there had been no compensable taking of air rights. Justice
Brennan made reference to the familiar zoning standard estab-
lished by the Court in Euclid v. Ambler Realty Company84 when
he said that "[tihe restrictions imposed are substantially related
to the promotion of the general welfare. . .. ,"I The Court did
refuse to reject the determination of the New York City Council
that "the preservation of landmarks benefit [sic] all New York
citizens and all structures, both economically and by improving
the quality of life in the city as a whole. . . . " The holding in
Penn Central, however, certainly does not preclude the Court
from finding a compensable taking of property in a future case
in which an owner alleges that a designation as a landmark im-
poses a severe economic burden, or that the structure is no longer
suitable for its original purposes, or that little or no other property
in the community is subject to similar restrictions. The Supreme
Court held that no taking had occurred when the owners wanted
to redevelop the property, leaving the landmark intact. Yet ironi-
cally for the commission and all those interested in preservation,
the possibility remains that the Court's answer may have been,
or may be, different if Penn Central had requested, and was re-
fused, approval for demolition on the grounds of economic hard-
ship.
Jane W. Trinkley
83. Id. at 136.
84. 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926). See, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1
(1974); Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928); Construction Indus. Ass'n of
Sonoma County v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S.
934 (1975); Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v. Town of Sanborton, 338 F. Supp. 301 (D.N.H. 1972);
Zevlin v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 30 Conn. Supp. 157, 306 A.2d 151 (1973); Smith v. City
of Miami Beach, 213 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 1968); Tulsa Rock Co. v. Bd. of City Comm'rs of
Rogers County, 531 P.2d 351 (Okla. App. 1974); Bob Jones Univ., Inc. v. City of Green-
ville, 243 S.C. 351, 133 S.E.2d 843 (1963); City of Houston v. Johnny Frank's Auto Parts
Co., 480 S.W.2d 774 (Tex. App. 1972).
85. 438 U.S. at 138.
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